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INTRODUCTION: WHAT WILL WE Do WHEN
ADJUDICATION ENDS?
A BRIEF INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF ADR

Carrie Menkel-Meadow*
I begin by thanking the UCLA Law Review, and particularly Darrin
Mollet and Bryce Johnson, for seeing the timeliness of the topic of alternative dispute resolution and organizing this Symposium-collecting some
of the best thinkers, writers, and practitioners in the field to discuss, among
other things, the economics of ADR, the role of lawyers, courts, and judges
in ADR, and the application of ADR to a variety of substantive legal and
regulatory problems. In this Introduction, I would like to introduce the
topics and the authors, and put them in the larger context of the movement that is now called "ADR," and the fear it engenders that it might
I will develop here an
indeed "end adjudication" as we know it.'
extremely short and understated intellectual history of the field and
describe, briefly, what the field has already taught us-What are the "propositions" of learning that come from ADR? I will try, as well, to describe
some of the current difficult and controversial issues and topics that
confront the field and that many of our authors will address in these pages.

A Brief Intellectual History of the Field
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when I first began writing about
negotiation and dispute settlement, there was virtually no field in which to
situate this work. Socio-legal scholars were engaged in both more abstract
* Professor of Law, UCLA Law School; Co-Director, Center for Inter-Racial/Inter-Ethnic
Conflict Resolution, UCLA; Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This
Introduction is a revised and edited version of the opening remarks given at the Symposium, What
Will We Do When Adjudication Ends?, held at UCLA on March 8, 1997. I want to thank my
research assistant Edward Kim for excellent work and service beyond the call of duty on this
Introduction and on the Article that appears in this Symposium.
1. For an insightful argument that civil litigation and law making has already been

transformed by forces, in addition to ADR, and has been changed to "devolve" more control to
trial judges, lawyers, and parties, rather than appellate judges, see Stephen C. Yeazell, The

Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WiS. L. REV. 631. For an argument
that too much settlement activity has not only decreased the amount of litigation, but actually
threatens the quality of our trial advocates, see Kevin C. McMunigal, The Costs of Settlement: The
Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication on Litigating Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV. 833 (1990).
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and more empirically based studies of disputing across cultures,2 and legal
clinicians were trying to teach law students how to negotiate,3 while the
profession held a conference, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice,4 exploring, among other things, new ways to
process cases.' Some of my colleagues urged me not to write about the
"shadow" activities of lawyers as settlers of cases-"it was not the main
event;" "it was not about law;" "it had little or no doctrine;" and "there
was no theory there."6 This seemed strange to me because I was interested
in interdisciplinary work and I knew that scholars in many other disciplines
had explored the theory and practice of negotiation processes-in international relations, in anthropology, in economics, in social and cognitive
psychology, in decision sciences, in game theory, in business, and in family
relations, to name a few. 7 And, the popular press was buzzing with selfhelp books telling people they could "negotiate anything. '
For me, this subject was intensely practical as well as rich in academic
and theoretical interest. When I was a legal services lawyer in the early
1970s, I noticed that as successful as we were in "winning" lawsuits, often
at the summary judgment stage, in challenges to welfare regulations, prison
rules, employment practices, and other institutional "wrongs," it did not
take long for the institutions committing these wrongs to adapt and change
their rules, without really changing their practices. Although we were
2.
See, e.g., LAURA NADER & HARRY F. TODD, JR., THE DISPUTING PROCESS: LAW IN
TEN SOCIETIES (1978); Richard L. Abel, A ComparativeTheory of Dispute Institutionsin Society, 8
L. & Soc'Y REv. 217 (1973).
3. See, e.g., GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: NEGOTIATION
(1981).
4.

See NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH

THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSICE, THE POUND CONFERENCE (A. Leo Levin & Russell R.
Wheeler eds., 1976); The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
Addresses Delivered at the National Conference, 70 F.R.D. 79-246 (1976).
5. See Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing,70 F.R.D. 111 (1976).
6. To protect the guilty, I have not attributed these direct quotes to particular individuals.
7. For a review of some of this work in other fields, as well as the early work in law, see

Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation:A Study of Strategiesin Search of a Theory, 1983 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 905.
8. See, e.g., HERB COHEN, YOU CAN NEGOTIATE ANYTHING (1980).
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9
often evaluated by how much "impact" litigation we brought, I realized
that some of the lawyers in my office who were successful at negotiatingwith
government officials, caseworkers, supervisors, employers, and some law
enforcement officials, actually accomplished more-at least for their indiviAnd so, I became interested in solving problems rather
dual clients.'
than winning cases. As I explored the literature to help me learn how to
become a better negotiator, I learned that the legal academy had done little
to formally study and educate about this essential legal function. So, I
started to teach and write about negotiation and the resolution of cases
before trial, 1 and I found that the work in disciplines outside of law had
more to say about negotiation and conflict-resolution processes than did
legal doctrine.
I was, of course, not the first to teach and write about negotiation.
There had, in fact, been several negotiation courses offered before I began.
At the University of Michigan, James J. White, well known as a
commercial lawyer and scholar, taught a negotiation course modeled on a
duplicate bridge tournament. Students competed with each other and were
scored on how much "gain" they achieved for their clients, usually as mea2
sured on a zero-sum basis as what they "took" from the other side.' At
the University of Washington, Cornelius Peck and William Fletcher also
pioneered a negotiation course based on their recognition that in the fields

9. This seemed a silly way to evaluate whether poverty had been ameliorated or whether
our clients were leading better lives because of our intervention. This may have been the par-

ticular environment in which I practiced. With an eye on the bottom line, consumers of legal
services with economic interests may have other standards of evaluating whether they have

received adequate, just, or efficient legal services. Despite the claims of some people that ADR

was used to siphon off "minor cases" or "rights cases" away from the courts, see RICHARD ABEL,
THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (1984), Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of
Law: Hierarchy and Pacificationin the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 1 (1993), some of the earliest and most enthusiastic users of ADR were major corporations with big disputes who were trying to solve their legal problems more efficiently and at
lower cost.
10. I would like to acknowledge the work of my friend and sometime mentor in legal services, Linda Bernstein, who was a successful and caring negotiator and is now an administrative
law judge in the social security system in Philadelphia.
11. All the while still teaching Trial Advocacy and other litigation-related courses as well.
12. See HARRY T. EDWARDS & JAMES J. WHITE, PROBLEMS, READINGS AND MATERIALS
ON THE LAWYER AS NEGOTIATOR (1977).
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of labor law and torts, settlement was more often the norm than full
adjudication. 3 And in one of those wonderful moments of intellectual
convergence, while I was teaching negotiation and finishing a long article,
Roger Fisher and William Ury at Harvard published a popular book on
principled negotiation designed to emphasize joint gain in negotiations, and
it became a run-away best seller. 4 Thus, different pedagogies developed
from different theories about whether the purpose of negotiation was to
beat the other side or resolve the problem and achieve joint gain. 15
. By the early 1980s we had a field, at least of teaching and with some
scholarship developing. At the institutional and judicial level, Professor
Frank Sander's speech at the 1976 Pound Conference on the causes of
popular dissatisfaction with the administration of justice" gave birth to
the idea of the "multi-door courthouse," in which a screening clerk would
help the parties choose from a variety of dispute processes that would meet
the needs and requirements of their particular dispute: some disputes involving parties with long-term relationships (such as neighbors, employees,
family members) might go to mediation, whereas others would seek
arbitration and a faster and cheaper award. Still others might get directed
to a governmental ombudsman, and some disputants would opt for a full
trial. Thus, different kinds of disputes might require different treatments,
and if we could triage legal cases the way that doctors and nurses triage
medical cases, perhaps the caseload could be better and more efficiently
handled. Skilled facilitators might improve communications between
parties or help them discover their underlying needs and interests. Or,
perhaps someone might give the parties a neutral evaluation of the facts in
dispute or an analysis of the legal claims and rights they are demanding.
From the beginning, the multi-door courthouse itself represented the
duality of purposes associated with ADR-efficiency and docket-clearing
potential, as well as a claim for a better quality of justice with designated
processes providing more tailor-made solutions to legal problems. 1"
13. See WILLIAM FLETCHER & CORNELIUS J. PECK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
NEGOTIATION (1972).
14. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT

GIVING IN (2d ed. 1991). This book has sold over two million copies and has been published in
18 languages.
15.

See id.; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation, 31 UCLA L.

REV. 754 (1984); James White, The Pros and Cons of "Getting to Yes," 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 115
(1984).
16.

17.

See supra note 4.

See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Dispute Resolution: The Periphery Becomes the Core, 69

JUDICATURE 300 (1986) (reviewing STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION

(1992)).
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Trying to decide what kind of case belongs in which forum remains
one of the most interesting and understudied questions. While many courts
now exempt particular classes of cases from some kinds of treatments
(constitutional and civil rights cases are commonly exempted from courtannexed arbitration or mediation programs'"), some have argued for dividing various forms of ADR along the lines of cases seeking decision
(arbitration, adjudication, or some kind of neutral evaluation), and those
seeking settlement (mediation, discovery planning, or conciliation).I9
Others suggest we can sort cases by whether the parties provide for some
form of ADR ex ante (before the dispute ripens, as in a contract), or wait
until the dispute has already occurred and is formally a case.20 By analyzing factors such as what is at stake (what is the "res" of the dispute), who
are the participants, how voluntary and long-standing is their relationship,
do the parties need a precedential ruling or an efficient end to their dispute,
and are there issues of privacy or broadly known norms,21 the parties can
choose from a variety of formats to resolve their dispute-some in the public sector and others to be used in private.
As we have learned from court programs, some of these issues and
distinctions have begun to blur-another factor that makes study of our
field so interesting-so that we have med-arb, or evaluative rather than
facilitative 22 mediation, when people would like a consensual joint
decision-making process but want to build in a third-party decision if their
own efforts fail. And, we have "presumptively mandatory" referrals to
ADR (from which parties may opt out with a showing of good cause) in
order to ensure some efforts at "voluntary" participation. 23 It is becoming
harder and harder to keep definitional integrity between processes as the
parties' needs and court requirements have altered our original understandings. I have come to the view that almost any dispute would benefit
from some form of ADR exposure, and thus, I have moved from a position
18. See ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1996).
19. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on JudicialADR and the Multi-Door Courthouseat
Twenty, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297 (1996).
20. See Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1995).
21. See Stephen B. Goldberg & Frank E.A. Sander, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss, 10
NEGOTIATION J. 49 (1994); Menkel-Meadow, supranote 7, at 927-28.
22. See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques:
A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 7 (1996).
23. Stephanie Smith, Remarks at the UCLA Symposium on Alternative Dispute Resolution
(Mar. 8, 1997). Stephanie Smith is the former director of the Northern District of California
Multi-Option Program on ADR.
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of advocating only voluntary ADR to supporting presumptively mandatory
ADR-with party choice about which process should be used. In my
experience, it is just as often the personalities of the lawyers or the
parties, 24 as it is some structural aspect of their dispute, that will determine which process is best for a particular case.
With a more sophisticated focus on the different kinds of cases that
exist and some concern about the etiology of a dispute, law schools have
begun to study how disputes occur, and how we go from perceiving an
injurious experience to deciding whether to convert that into a legal
case25 (by "naming, blaming and claiming ' 26 as one set of scholars has
called it). Thus, in order to fully apprehend how we process information
and whether we attribute blame to ourselves or someone else, we need to
understand both the psychology and sociology of disputing. I teach my
students to ask of every dispute-resolution problem the journalists' questions-what are the who, what, where, when, how, and why of the dispute?
What is at stake, who is involved, what is needed to be done, and how can
it be accomplished? In a broader sense, negotiation is also essential to the
making of transactions and the building of legal, social, and economic
institutions, which has also eluded much formal legal study until relatively
recently.27
And so the field was created, though perhaps mushy around its
boundaries, to try to understand how we dispute with each other and in
larger groups of people, organizations, entities, and legal families, such as
corporations and class actions. However, as the field of ADR has developed, and more and more people have gained interest in the idea of "solving human problems," the field has also begun to develop its critics. There
are those who think that settlement is not always the most appropriate way
to deal with important disputes; 2 or that whole classes of people may be
disadvantaged by particular processes; 29 or that alternative forms of dispute
24. See, e.g., ROBERT M. BRAMSON, COPING WITH DIFFICULT PEOPLE (1981); WILLIAM
URY, GETTING PAST NO: NEGOTIATING WITH DImCULT PEOPLE (1991).

25.

See William L.F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 L. &

Soc'y REv. 63 (1974) (exploring how one of the most common forms of dispute processing is
lumping it or doing nothing).
26. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming and Claiming.... 15 L. & Soc'y REV. 631 (1980-1981).
27. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreward: Business Lauwyers and Value
Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REv. 1 (1995).
28. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
29. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternatie:
Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991).
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30
resolution have already been co-opted or tainted by traditional processes;
or that we may not generate enough clear rules and norms to be able to
govern human behavior.

Of Theory, Practice, Evaluation, and Policy
What have we learned from the field of ADR so far that might inform
how we conduct adjudication and dispute settlement and norm articulation
in general? What propositions of knowledge have the fields of ADR and
conflict resolution contributed to what we know?
First, we have learned that one size does not fit all-that is sociology's
contribution to law. Conditions, disputes, people, and rules are variable
and different configurations of disputants, issues, and stakes in disputes may
militate in favor of different forms of disputing (adversarial or competitive
forms for scarce-resource, single-issue, two-party disputes," or collaborative, more integrative processes for disputes in which we want to create
value before we have to claim it,33 if at all).
Thus, before we assume all legal disputes are about scarce resources
that must be divided, we might ask instead how can we "expand the pie"
and look for ways to increase the available resources. By broadening the
issues, parties, and stakes in the dispute, we may actually increase the likelihood of settling it. Different processes have different logics. While it may
be good to narrow issues for clarity at trial, it is better to expand issues (to
34
be available for trade) when we are seeking to settle a case.
Next, we do not all approach disputes and conflicts in the same way.
Where do our default positions of behavior come from-why are some
people hopeful and optimistic and risk-seeking and others both risk and loss
averse? This is social, developmental, and cognitive psychology's contribution to law. We learn some things from our families; others may be base
human predispositions-with some individuals more malleable and suscep30. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of
Innovation Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991).
31. See Fiss, supra note 28; David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83
GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995).
32. See HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982).
33.

See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR:

BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN (1986).
34. This is what gets some judges into trouble when they move from being trial judges to
managers of settlement conferences. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Forand Against Settlement: Uses
and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485 (1985).
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tible to change (with negotiation or mediation training, for example) than
others.
Related to our different predilections or preferences for dispute modes,
we also have different values and preferences about the things that make up
the dispute. This is a good thing, not a bad one. To the extent that our
interests are different from one another, they may be complimentary and
not competing with each other.35 Thus, we can trade, rather than fight or
compete; we can engage in log-rolling, rather than battle over the scarce
resource that is used to monetize or commodify all of our disputes in the
36
legal system-money.
We have also learned from the fine work of the interdisciplinary collaboration at the Stanford Center on Conflict Resolution and
Negotiation 37 that as humans we have heuristic biases in how we process
information that may systematically distort what we can accomplish. So,
we are more likely to act to avoid the loss of something we have than to
risk a little to improve our chances of a gain. And, most importantly for
dispute resolution, we systematically undervalue anything offered to us or
told to us by the other side. Thus, reactive devaluation 3' prevents us from
accurately assessing information or offers provided by the other side and
provides a useful rationale for why we need mediators-third-party neutrals
can help us hear things better by presenting information and proposals in a
more neutral setting. 9 In a related insight that sociologists call labeling
theory, Professor Lee Ross demonstrated, in an experimental setting, that
when faced with proposals from "out groups" (such as the Board of Trustees
of Stanford University in the South African divestment controversy) that
See GEORGE C. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1961).
36. See STEVEN J. BRAMS, FAIR DIVISION: FROM CAKE CUTTING TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(1996); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 795-801. I return to my personal connections at

35.

UCLA to illustrate this point: Some years ago when I was explaining all this to a group of my
colleagues at the faculty club, I noticed that we were wearing down the cocktail snacks by each
choosing a different item of choice-one chose pretzels, another wheatchex, another peanuts, and
another goldfish. We could satisfy many different needs without competing with each other.
See, e.g., BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995);
37.

Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Explorationof Barriersto Resolution of Conflict, 8
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 235 (1993).

38.

See Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluationin Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO

CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 37, at 26.

39. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA. L.
REV. 323 (1994).
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are actually more favorable to one's desired position, people prefer the less
advantageous proposals from their own "in groups" (the student
proposal) .0

In addition to these somewhat sobering teachings, we also have some
good news. In a much touted study, Robert Axelrod, a political scientist at
Michigan, ran a computer tournament for game theorists4' who had been
working on iterations of the prisoner's dilemma game, 42 and discovered
that the most robust program was one (called tit-for-tat) that began by
cooperating, defected when it was defected against, but was forgiving in
that it defected for no more than one round.43 Thus, a cooperative rather
than competitive defecting program was found to be not only successful,
but robust as well-it could survive well among the more competitive programs. This study has implications for human behavior 4 as well as legal
behavior.45 When do we cooperate? In sharing and processing information in a negotiation? In discovery? Applying this work to the work of
lawyers as agents, Robert Mnookin and Ronald Gilson have argued that
lawyers have incentives to act cooperatively and to develop reputations as
cooperative agents for their clients, 4" countering many of the common
assumptions that lawyers, who naturally compete, actually make disputes
worse.
40.

See Ross, supra note 38, at 30-33.

41.

42.

See ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
See WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (1992).

43.

This program was submitted by the game theorist Anatol Rapaport of the University of

Toronto. In subsequent iterations, tit-for-tat did not always beat all the other programs, but it
was remarkably robust overall. See Douglas R. Hofstadter, MetamagicalThemas: Computer Tournaments of the Prisoner'sDilemma Suggest How CooperationEvolves, SCI. AM., May 1983, at 16.
44. Biologists have been interested in the success of cooperative genes in a competitive gene
pool. See Edward 0. Wilson, The Genetic Evolution of Altruism, in ALTRUISM, SYMPATHY, AND
HELPING 11 (Lauren Wispt ed., 1978); see also MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE (1996);
Herbert A. Simon, A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful Altruism, 250 SCIENCE 1665

(1990).
45. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism Possible in Lawyering?, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 385
(1992); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: The Motivations of Social Justice
Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING (Austin Sarat & Stuart Sheingold eds., 1997).
46. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and
Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509 (1994). In a slightly different vein,
Craig McEwen, Nancy Rogers, and Richard Maiman have argued that legal representation
actually helps the parties in divorce mediation. See Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring In the Lawyers:
Challengingthe Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV.
1317 (1995).
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In work that has informed and is being affected by dispute resolution
theory and practice, analysts of the litigation process have sought to
explain, both theoretically and empirically, the choices that lawyers and
parties make about whether to litigate or to settle-known in the literature
as "the selection hypothesis." 47
Several researchers have begun to explore the theoretical claims that
some classes of people are particularly disadvantaged in their use of some
kinds of dispute processes. For example, Ian Ayres has documented that
there are race and gender disparities and discrimination in negotiations for
the sale of cars. 4' There are also a number of studies designed to test the
claims made by Trina Grillo, Richard Delgado, Laura Nader, and others,
that there are systemic race, gender, ethnic, and class biases in particular
forms of dispute processing. One study, the Metro Court Project, completed by a group of researchers at the University of New Mexico,49 has
already produced some interesting and complex findings. For example,
although white women may fare better in mediation, they claim to like it
less than adjudication (in small-claims settings), and minorities, who may
not fare as well in mediation, prefer it over adjudication. In addition,
minorities achieve more favorable results when their third-party neutrals are
also minorities, providing some support for the idea of "matching" in
choices about third-party neutrals or facilitators.5 0 In some sense, this
study confirms what one set of psychologists documented some years ago,
that in evaluating satisfaction with dispute processes, it is not only outcome, but process values that matter-and parties may value different
things." Thus, due process matters, but what process is due may vary by
person, matter, and context.
47. See, e.g., George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman's
Mistakes, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215 (1985); Linda R. Stanley & Don L. Coursey, EmpiricalEvidence

on the Selection Hypothesis and the Decision to Litigate or Settle, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 145 (1990);
Robert E. Thomas, The Trial Selection Hypothesis Without the 50 Percent Rule, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
209 (1995); see also Jeffrey Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189
(1987) (suggesting that attorney-client conflicts of interest in contingent fee structures affect
litigation and settlement decisions).
48. See Ian Ayres, FairDriving; Gender and Race DiscriminationinRetail Car Negotiations, 104
HARV. L. REv. 817 (1991); Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations
and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REv. 109 (1995).
49. See Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants'Ethnicity and Gender on
Monetary Outcomes inMediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 L. & SOC'Y REV. 767 (1996).
50. See Isabelle R. Gunning, Diversity Issues inMediation: Controlling Negative Cultural Myths,
1995 J. Disp. RESOL. 55.
51. See E. ALLAN LIND & THOMAS R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE (1988).
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Finally, as these and other propositions of our field are developed, we
have begun to see some increase in the empirical work on dispute resolution processes to evaluate these theoretical claims, as well as those of
more common program evaluations-does the program of dispute resolution
do what it promises? In addition to the RAND Reports,52 we have increasing numbers of studies attempting to understand the disputing behavior of
parties before they file litigation and after, whether they file in state or
federal court, and whether they litigate or settle."

What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends?
Our Symposium is entitled What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends?,
and so it is important to remember that when we talk about allocating
disputes to particular processes, we are always comparing processes, as well
as disputes, to something else. Despite my great support of ADR (and my
practice of it too, as an arbitrator and mediator), I am not in favor of
ending adjudication. Adjudication is necessary to generate rules and
norms, and to exist as a final resort when the parties cannot resolve things
themselves and require a particular kind of decisionmaker-whether judge
or jury-each with its own logic, rationales, and functions within our judicial system. The interesting question for me, then, is not what will we do
when adjudication ends, but when and how should we use adjudication and
when should we use something else? And, must adjudication be structured
the way it is? Is it possible that we will learn something about alternative
processes that might transform adjudication itself to provide other ways of
54
presenting issues and arguing about governing principles?
We have gathered here some of the most distinguished and newer
theorists of ADR to address these and other issues. We examine the econo52. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF
MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUrRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996)
[hereinafter RAND ADR REPORT]; JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
JUST, SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM AT (1996) [hereinafter RAND CASE MANAGEMENT REPORT]

(visited July 25, 1997) <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR800>.
53. See, e.g., STATE JUSTICE INST., NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COURT-CONNECTED
DISPUrE RESOLUION RESEARCH (Susan Keilitz ed., 1994); DAVID M. TRUBEK ET AL.,
UNIVERSITY OF WIs. LAW SCH., CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL REPORT (1983);

John P. Esser, Evaluationsof Dispute Processing: We Do Not Know What We Think and We Do Not
Think What We Know, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 499 (1989); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud,
Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 319 (1991).
54. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
ludticulturalWorld, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996).
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mics of ADR, the ways in which individuals process information, 55 the
role of particular psychological states, such as hope, in successfully negotiating,56 as well as what the barriers or impediments to settlement are, and
how the structure of process affects what we can accomplish.57 We also
look at some of the deep jurisprudential issues implicated in the choices
between alternative processes and adjudication. What does justice mean in
process? Who ought to be resolving disputes-judges, juries, and the courts
or private providers? What kind of accountability should there be for dispute settlement?" What will be the roles of lawyers and judges in a more
variegated dispute resolution landscape?59 We also explore the public
policy implications when ADR processes are used in new substantive contexts. Clark Freshman explores both the promise and difficulties of using
mediation in single-sex relationships-relationships in which private and
informal processes may offer the greatest potential for self-regulation and
Both Eric Green61 and Francis McGovern, who
larger commitments.'
have served as Special Masters in many of the nation's complex mass tort
cases, explore the use of new forms of case processing in the increasingly
complicated national classes that comprise our response to the injuries of
modem mass consumer life.
55. See Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, Common Knowledge as a Barrier to Negotiation, 44
UCLA L. REv. 1631 (1997).
56. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Role of Hope in Negotiation, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1661 (1997).
57.

See Bruce Hay, Procedural Justice-Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803 (1997).

58. For a spirited and still timely debate on the accountability of third-party neutrals for the
resolutions over which they preside, see Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the
Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1 (1981), and Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of
Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85 (1981).
59. See Eric Green, What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? We'll Settle in Bunches:
Bringing Rule 23 into the Twenty-First Century, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1773 (1997); Francis
E. McGovern, Rethinking Cooperation Among Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1851 (1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts
Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871 (1997).
60. See Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex "Marriage* Through Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Community-Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1687
(1997).
61. Eric helped pioneer the field of ADR and founded JAMS/Endispute, one of the first
private providers of dispute resolution services, including designing processes for complex litigation and offering mediation and arbitration services. He was also one of the principal innovators
of the first private "mini-trial"-a process that combines negotiation, advocacy, and case presentation, with settlement talks, case evaluation, and some mediation, putting a variety of primary
forms of ADR together to construct a hybrid, designed to maximize party attention to the dispute
at hand. See ERIC GREEN, THE CPR LEGAL PROGRAM MINI-TRIAL HANDBOOK (1982); Eric
Green et al., Settling Large Case Litigation: An Alternative Approach, 11 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 493
(1978).
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Another issue this Symposium addresses is how we are to evaluate the
results of ADR programs. Pursuant to the requirements of the Civil Justice
Reform Act (CJRA),62 Congress has ordered an empirical evaluation of
the federal courts' efforts to reduce the cost and delay of litigation through
That study was
case management techniques, as well as ADR 3
conducted principally by the Institute of Civil Justice at the RAND
corporation. As the Judicial Conference studies this report and a smaller
one conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, 64 it will make recommendations to Congress about both the reauthorization and reappropriation of
funds for activities provided for in the CJRA. These reports and the
debates that have already ensued 65 will make clear the dimensions of our
policy concerns about the proper role of courts in an age in which increasingly few cases make it to the adjudication stage at all.' The respective
roles of the public and private sectors 67 in dispute settlement and norm
generation will continue to be debated in this context, as well as others.

The PersonalSide: The People of ADR
Finally, because the field of ADR is concerned about the people in
disputes and the effects of process on people, it is important to take note of
the personal losses we have recently suffered in the field. In the past year
and a half, we have lost a number of individuals who have greatly contributed to the field in very different ways, illustrating one of my themes
that the study and practice of "appropriate dispute resolution" processes
engages us simultaneously on many different levels, including high theory,
applied theory, applications that vary by context, empirical study and evaluation, skills learning, and teaching-all as we attempt to figure out the
most just, fair, and efficient ways to solve human problems and resolve
disputes.
62.

28 U.S.C. § 479 (1994).

63.
64.

See RAND ADR REPORT, supra note 52.

See DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., A STUDY OF THE FIVE
DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990
(1997).

65. See, e.g., John Gibeaut, Was RAND Right?, 1997 A.B.A. J. 98; Elizabeth Plapinger,
RAND Study of Civil Justice Reform Act Sparks Debate, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 24, 1997, at B18.
66. See Kent D. Syverud, ADR and the Decline of the American Civil Jury, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1935 (1997).
67. See Luban, supra note 31; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A
Philosophicaland Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995); see
also Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through ADR, 11 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 241 (1996).
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At Stanford, which has had the good fortune to develop a critical mass
of conflict resolution theorists from a number of related fields, Amos
Tverskym is sorely missed as a cognitive psychologist who, though having
no formal relation to law or ADR, has contributed an enormous amount to
what we know about how people process information and think about
things-with clear applications to conflict resolution and dispute
processing.

69

Trina Grillo, 70 who worked in the Bay Area as a law professor, mediator, and teacher of academic support, is known to many as having written
the now canonical text of feminist criticism of the mediation process.
Trina's work in mediation and civil rights has greatly affected many of
us, and I hope that we will continue to heed her words of caution.7
Jeffrey Z. Rubin," one of the key theorists and founders of the
modem conflict resolution field, was lost to us in a mountain climbing
accident, engaged as he always was in scaling new heights. There is virtually no issue in conflict resolution that Jeff did not touch, including the
social psychology of bargaining; 74 cultural variations in negotiation; 75 the
68. Professor of Psychology, Stanford University.
69. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO
CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 37; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment Under
Uncertainty, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and
the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251 (1986). I remember arguing with Professor Tversky at a
conference at Stanford about whether it was deviation from rational thought processes that
needed study and explanation (his life's work), or whether it was conformity to rational thinking
processes that needed study and explanation as being the more deviant of behaviors. How you
respond to this argument may depend a great deal on what you consider to be rational thinking
processes.
70. Professor of Law, University of San Francisco.
71. See Grillo, supra note 29.
72. For my own tribute to her teachings, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What Trina Taught
Me: Reflections on Mediation, Inequality, Teaching and Life, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1413 (1997).
73. Professor of Psychology, Tufts University; former Director of the Harvard Negotiation
Project; and Editor of the Negotiation Journal.
74. See DEAN G. PRUITT & JEFFREY Z. RUBIN, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION,
STALEMATE & SETTLEMENT (2d ed. 1993); JEFFREY Z. RUBIN & BERT R. BROWN, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION (1975).

75. See Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Frank E.A. Sander, Culture, Negotiation, and the Eye of the
Beholder, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 249 (1991).
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77
use of agents in conflict resolution; 76 and scores of other issues that
inspired a conference in his name and will soon culminate in a festschrift
78
honoring his work, published by the Harvard Negotiation Project.
Closer to our own home in law, we also recently lost Professor Maurice
Rosenberg, 79 a proceduralist of the first rank who, unlike many other modem proceduralists, was not afraid of ADR-indeed, he embraced it, wrote
about it,' and, in recent years, taught it at Columbia Law School. Maury
was truly remarkable in that he exemplified work in this field at all levels.
He completed one of the most significant empirical studies of the pretrial
conference, 8" whose results were recently confirmed, in part, by the
RAND Report on the Civil Justice Reform Act," and which I discuss
more fully in my own contribution to this Symposium. 3 Maury did important doctrinal work in civil procedure,84 as well as empirical work on civil
justice, 5 and he acknowledged the usefulness of some forms of ADR as
supplements to the civil adjudication system.8 6 Maury actually coined the
phrase: "fitting the forum to the fuss"' 7 -a phrase that many ADR enthusiasts have embraced as a way of analyzing which process is appropriate for
what kind of dispute. Like many of us who work in ADR and teach civil

76.

See Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Frank E.A. Sander, When Should We Use Agents?, 4

NEGOTIATION

J. 395 (1988).

77.

See CONFLICT, COOPERATION AND JUSTICE: ESSAYS INSPIRED BY THE WORK OF

79.

Professor of Law, Columbia University.

MORTON DEUTSCH (Barbara Benedict Bunker et al. eds., 1995).
78. See J. William Breslin, Negotiation Journal Editor Jeffrey Z. Rubin Dies in Accident, 11
NEGOTIATION J. 195 (1995).
80. See Maurice Rosenberg, Can Court-Related Alternatives Improve Our Dispute Resolution
System?, 69 JUDICATURE 254 (1986).
81.

See MAURICE ROSENBERG, THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE

(1964).
82.

See RAND CASE MANAGEMENT REPORT, supra note 52.

83. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 59.
84. See Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedurein Action, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
2197 (1989).
85. See Maurice Rosenberg, Civil Justice and Civil Justice Reform, 15 L. & SOC'Y REV. 473
(1981); Maurice Rosenberg, The Impact of Procedure-ImpactStudies in the Administration of Justice,
51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (1988).

86.
(1988).
87.

See Maurice Rosenberg, Resolving Disputes Differently, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 801
See Goldberg & Sander, supra note 21.
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procedure, Maury Rosenberg tried to understand how ADR and adjudication fit together-not seeing one as ending the other, but rather viewing each as supplementing or correcting the other-each being used in its
proper domain.88

Finally, I include someone not known at all as an ADR scholar, but
one who was sometimes an ADR practitioner, my colleague Julian Eule, s9
who just recently succumbed to cancer.9 When Howard Gadlin9 ' and I,
as Co-directors of UCLA's Center for Inter-Racial/Inter-Ethnic Conflict
Resolution, designed a nonadversarial process to explore the contentious
issue of affirmative action on UCLA's campus last year, we sought participants who were willing to engage in dialogue and conversation, instead
of debate. Julian was one of the participants who agreed to put himself
forward on this contentious issue, as a proponent of affirmative action, for
deeply personal, as well as institutional, reasons. Julian experimented with
ways of discussing issues and positions without debating and without being
positional, though he was an expert debater and appellate advocate. He
agreed to talk about his views, his own demographic position, and to be
questioned about his own doubts-"grey areas of thinking." Julian voluntarily did this in front of a large forum of people, all in service to the idea
92
of dialogues and alternative ways of having conflictual conversations.
We explored the issues with a greater variety of views and examined different positions on different aspects of controversial issues, demonstrating the
value of some forms of ADR that allow us to deal with the modern-day
88.

It is useful here to remember that Lon Fuller, who many of us regard as the jurisprude of

ADR, articulated that each process has its own logic, justification, and morality. See, e.g., LON
L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1969); Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargainingand the Arbitrator,

1963 Wis. L. REV. 3; Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353
(1978); Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 305 (1971). 1have
argued that, in one sense, the study of ADR is a continuation of the Legal Process analysis of
institutional competence and institutional settlement principles. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 401 (1997); see also HENRY M. HART,
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND

APPLICATION OF THE LAW (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).

89. Professor of Law and former Associate Dean, UCLA School of Law.
90. In what is a particularly sad and poignant connection to me, when Trina Grillo was
originally diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease, I put her in touch with Julian, who was a wonderful
counselor to cancer patients. At the time, we all thought that Julian was "cured"-he had been
cancer-free for over 10 years. Trina and Julian died within months of each other, at the same age
and working in the same profession on many of the same issues in their very different ways.

91. UCLA Ombudsperson.
92. For a slightly fuller description of this event, see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 54,

at 34-37.
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93
complexity and nonbinary nature of issues to be resolved. Thus, Julian
contributed to our field by agreeing to experiment in practice with new
forms of dealing with, and teaching about, conflict.
These are big losses for us, particularly as some suggest that we are a
weakly connected field, drawing insights where we can from a variety of
sources and disciplines, both inside and outside of law and the academy and
practice-so every theorist and every practitioner we lose is a loss to us all
as we struggle to conceptualize the field and work with its promises and
dilemmas.

Concluding Remarks
This brief and partial94 review of what we already know, and what we
will learn from this Symposium, should reveal that we need to think about
questions of process from several different levels simultaneously. We need
high theory (and we get that here from Ian Ayres, Barry Nalebuff, Jennifer
Gerarda Brown, Clark Freshman, and Bruce Hay); descriptions of and prescriptions for practice (from Francis McGovern and Eric Green); and
evaluation and empirical analysis (from Kent Syverud, Francis McGovern,
Eric Green, and to a lesser extent, from my own evaluative work), in both
quantitative and qualitative terms that can then enrich the policy discussion with which this Symposium is engaged.
What will we do when adjudication ends? As you have heard me say
before, I don't think it will, but it will certainly be changed by the greater
varieties of case processing and conflict resolution that are now available
for use and study. In my own view, ADR (in all its own variable forms) and
adjudication, have come to affect, supplement, and challenge each other.
93. Of course, inCalifornia, this issue was dealt with ina binary way-it began with an
election that was then challenged by the legal process. The legality of the California Civil
Rights Initiative (CCRI) now wends its way through the courts. For an example of the legal
arguments that are currently being litigated, see Vikram D. Amar & Evan H. Caminker, Equal
Protection, Unequal Political Burdens, and the CCRI, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019 (1996). For
an eloquent statement of the legal, economic, historical, emotional, and spiritual aspects of this
issue, see CHARLES LAWRENCE III & MARl J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK (1997); see also
Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84
CAL. L. REv. 953 (1996).
94. This is only a partial review of what we could say we know from the field; for my earlier
efforts to review the literature on negotiation, see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, and for literature on mediation, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation:The Transformation
of Traditions, Paradigms, Ideologies, and Practices, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 217 (1995). For my views on
the competing values that inform the field (quantitative-efficiency reasons versus qualitative,
quality-seeking solutions), see Menkel-Meadow, supranote 59.
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Thus, as we encounter many dialectical relations in law (rule and discretion, common law and statute, public and private, federal and state
systems), we can now add a dialogue and dynamic tension between and
among dispute processes and systems.9' So I invite you to engage with the
questions we have posed, the answers or propositions we have already supplied upon which we can reasonably rely, and the policy issues that we
discuss in the pages that follow.

95. See George L. Priest, Private Litigantsand the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L. REV.
527 (1989) (arguing that as ADR decreases the queue to trial, courts will become more available
and case backlogs will increase once again). In others words, at some point, ADR and the public
court system may arrive at some equilibrium point of access to justice, as each corrects for and
responds to the demands for the other.

